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gress and before the public in such a manner as to take them out of
the least-favored-of-all tax category. As Harriet F. Pilpel has said,
"Unless authors decide to and can make Congress respond to their
tax problem, at least to the extent as inventors have [or at least
to a reasonable degree], they would be well advised to turn their
pens into plow shares and to patent the latter at once."60
Linza B. Inabnit
AGENCY-AUTOMOBILE TORT LIABILITY OF THE MINOR
PRINCIPAL
Generally speaking, if two or more persons engage in a common
or joint enterprise, or other agency relationship, in which they use
and occupy a motor vehicle driven by one of their number, but in
the management of which all have equal authority and rights, each
assumes responsibility for the conduct of the one who is doing the
driving and each occupant is chargeable with the driver's negligence.1
This generality is an overstatement, however, for many courts say
that it does not apply to the minor.2
The scope of this paper is to examine the reasons which induced
courts to make a distinction between the infant and adult in this
area of the law and to examine the trend of recent court decisions.
It is assumed, for the purposes of this note, that a minor is engaged
in a common or joint enterprise or other agency relationship, with
the driver of a car which is involved in an accident, that the agent
driver was negligent, and that the minor is either suing or being
sued for injuries received as a result of the accident.
Early courts held that the infants contracts were voidable in
most situations, but when they were confronted with an attempt
by a minor to appoint another to act for him in the business world
they held the relationship void.3 In support of this position it has
been reasoned that if the acts done by the agent for the minor are
voidable at the minor's pleasure, then the power of attorney is not
operative according to its terms; whereas if the acts of the agent
0 Pilpel. "Developments in Tax Law Affecting Copyrights in 1954, 83 Taxes
271, 276 (1955).
1 2 Harper & James, Torts § 2613 (1956); Cf. Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103
Conn. 583, 131 AUt. 432 (1925).2 Palmer v. Miller, 380 I1. 256, 43 N.E. 2d 973 (1942); Hodge v. Feiner,
338 Mo. 268, 90 S.W. 2d 90 (1935).
3 Ibid.
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are binding upon the minor, then he has done by another what he
could not do himself.4
The result of this reasoning was carried over into the automobile
tort liability field to prevent the imputation of negligence to the minor
principal. However, the reasons which were perhaps valid in the
contract field have no validity in the tort field. While the minor lacks
legal capacity to make a binding contract, which perhaps should not
be circumvented by the use of an agent, the minor who commits a
tort cannot avoid responsibility for the tort as he could avoid a
contract.
This defense of minority, by which some would have a court bar
recovery where it is justly due, does not apply where the minor
commits a tort himself, but only applies where a person acting under
the authority and control of the minor commits a tort.5 As a general
rule the infant is liable for his own torts provided he possessed the
mental and physical capacity requisite to the commission of the
tort.6
The protection given the minor principal in the tort field is partly
based on the premise that agency is a contractual relationship. This
is not necessarily true. Since no consideration is needed for the
establishment of an agency relationship, it is not essential to find a
contract. Legal writers on the subject take the position that agency
is a consensual relationship requiring only that the principal have
the power to give legally operative consent.7 However, case au-
thority to support this proposition is definitely lacking.
While seeking to hold a minor principal liable may have been
of little importance in the early days of our history, today the growth
of insurance and the improved financial position of infants have
placed them on a par with adults. To meet the obvious injustice re-
sulting from the immunity of minors, courts have utilized two methods
for not barring the imputation of negligence merely on the ground
that the principal is a minor. One method that the courts have used
is to say that, although under agency principles a minor cannot
appoint an agent and thereby subject himself to liability, these prin-
ciples do not apply where the driver is acting in the immediate
presence and subject to the direction of the minor who has the right
4 Gregory, "Infant's Responsibility For His Agent's Tort," 5 Wis. L. Rev.
453 (1930); Mechem, Agency § 141 (2d ed. 1914).5 Palmer v. Miller, 380 IMI. 256, 43 N.E. 2d 973, 975 (1942); Hodge v.
Feiner, 338 Mo. 268, 90 S.W. 2d 90, 91 (1935).
62 Harper & James, Torts § 2612 (1956); Cf. Brown v. Wood, 293 Mich.
148, 291 N.W. 255, 256 (1940).
' Mechem, Outlines of Agency § 419 (4th ed. 1952); Restatement (second),
Agency § 20(b) (1958); Seavy, 'The Rationale of Agency," 29 Yale L. J. 859,
863 (1920).
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to control his.operation of the car.8 This view treats the driver of
the car as the "alter ego" or 'long arms" of the minor principal. By
such a view, the negligence of the driver is the negligence of the
minor principal. 9 This permits the courts to talk in terms of "pri-
mary negligence" for which a minor can be liable in any jurisdiction.
It should be noted that the above cases utilizing this method
involved situations in which the minor principal furnished the car
in which he was riding. This "ownership" might have given him a
greater right to control the driver than he would have in the or-
dinary joint venture relationship, and may have been as essential
factor in the court's conclusion. Therefore, while this approach has
merit its applicability may be restricted because a higher "degree
of control," resulting from "ownership," may be required than exists
in the ordinary joint venture relationship.' 0
A second method used by the courts has been to find "vicarious
liability" by holding the appointment of the agent by the minor
merely voidable, and imputing the negligence of the agent com-
mitted within the scope of the agency to the minor where there has
not been a prior avoidance of the agency relationship.
The more recent and apparently better considered cases place
an infant's appointment of an agent, and the acts of the agent
thereunder, in the same class as the other acts of an infant, and con-
sider them merely voidable and not absolutely void." The modem
doctrine is to the effect that, except for a narrowly limited class of
contracts which are valid and binding upon him, an infant's con-
tracts are voidable, but not void.' 2
The use of this method requires the view that a subsequent
disaffirmance of the agency relationship does not avoid the relation-
ship ab initio,'3 but only takes effect from the time of the disaffirm-
ance. The courts have adopted such a view.'4
This extension of the law has permitted the courts to impute
8 Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S.W. 2d 828 (1938); Wilson
v. Mullen, 11 Tenn. App. 319 (1930).9 Frye v. Baskin, 241 Mo. App. 319, 231 S.W. 2d 630 (1950); Haynie v.
Jones, 233 Mo. App. 948, 127 S.W. 2d 105 (1939); Feagles v. Sullivan 32 Pa.
D. & C. 47 (1938); Wilson v. Moudy, 22 Tenn. App. 356, 123 S.W. 2d 828
(1938); Wilson v. Mullen, 11 Tenn. App. 319 (1930).
10 See Feagles v. Sullivan, 32 Pa. D. & C. 47 (1938).
11AhlIstedt v. Smith, 130 Neb. 372, 264 N.W. 889 (1936); Scott v. Schisler,
107 N. J. L. 397, 153 Ad. 395 (1931).
12 Casey v. Kastel, 237 N.Y. 305, 142 N.E. 671 (1924).
13 The view has been taken that the infant should, at his request, be excused
from liability for torts committed by his servant or agent. Such a view permits
a subsequent disafrmance of the agency relationship, by the infant, to avoid
the relationship ab initfio. See Ferson, Principles of Agency § 49 (1954).
'4 Scott V. Shisler, 107 N.J.L. 397, 153 AUt. 395 (1931); Cf. Casey v. Kastel.
237 N.Y. 305, 142 N.E. 671 (1924).
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negligence to the minor as a principal, staiding on equal footing
with adult principals, where the agent commits a tort. 5 Thus, the
courts have denied recovery to a minor principal, injured while a
passenger in an automobile, by imputing the negligence of the
driver to him. The policy behind this determination to find liability
has been aptly stated:
A minor may own an automobile; and if he is of sufficient age and
judgment he not only has the legal ability to control its use and
operation, but he is legally chargeable with that responsibility.'6.
Whether the question of contributory negligence of the minor
principal as a plaintiff or the question of his negligence as a defendant
is being considered, the same test should be applied. The relation-
ship between him and the driver is the same in either situation.'
Attempts, however, have been made to distinguish between im-
puted negligence and imputed contributory negligence.'8 One court
said that negligence would not be imputed to the minor principal
where he was being sued, and distinguished a similar case as being
one where contributory negligence was imputed. 19 Perhaps the justi-
fication for this distinction is the attitude of the court that the minor
should be protected from being put heavily in debt before he reaches
adulthood, but should not be allowed to capitalize upon his minority
at the expense of a defendant who would otherwise have a valid
defense.
While at first glance one might feel that there is considerable
merit in such an argument it does not hold up in the world of today.
Most states have automobile liability statutes20 requiring, as a prac-
tical matter, that liability insurance be carried on all cars.21 While
the purpose of such a statute is mainly to prevent an injured plaintiff
from meeting with an insolvent defendant, the statute also protects
a defendant from having his resources wiped out and being put into
debt. When a judgment is recovered against a minor principal for
injuries received in an automobile accident, it will be paid in almost
every instance by an insurance company. The only monetary effect
15 Waggoner v. Simmons, 117 S.W. 2d 553 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
16 Parks v. Pere Marquette Ry., 315 Mich. 88, 23 N.W. 2d196, 198 (1946).
17 Feagles v. Sullivan, 32 Pa. D. & C. 47, 50 (1938).
18 See Haynie v. Jones, 233 Mo. App. 948, 127 S.W. 2d 105 (1939); Hodge
v. Feiner, 338 Mo. 268; 90 S.W. 2d 90 (1935).
19 See Hodge v. Feiner, 838 Mo. 268, 90 S.W. 2d 90 (1935).2o Vorys, "A Short Survey of Laws Designed to Exclude the Financially
Irresponsible Driver From the Highway," 15 Ohio St. L. J. 101, 102 (1954).
21 Generally the statutes require the deposit of security by one involved
in an accident which becomes unnecessary if the driver or owner is covered by
liability insurance above certain minimum levels. Practically speaking, this "re-
quires" liability insurance. For an example of a financial responsibility law, see Ky.
Rev. Stat. ch. 187 (1959).
[Vol. 47,
the judgment will have on the minor is perhaps in slightly higher
insurance rates.
A good example of cases holding that a minor principal may be
held liable as a defendant is Scott v. Schisler,22 wherein a minor
had borrowed his father's car for the purpose of attending a foot-
ball game. While on the way home, a companion whom the defend-
ant had allowed to drive negligently caused an accident which re-
sulted in injuries to the plaintiff. The court said:
The creation of an agent by an infant is not void ab initio, but
voidable at his option.... So long as the infant sees fit to continue
the existence of the agency, he is answerable for the negligence of
his representative in the performance of the duty which the agency
carries with it.23
In addition to the two methods listed above, there is the possi-
bility that the question of age of the principal will not be raised or
considered by the court. Thus, in denying recovery to a minor prin-
cipal's administrator in Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. McNulty24 the court
unhesitatingly imputed the agent driver's negligence to the minor
principal riding in the car. The question of minority was not dis-
cussed but the fact was revealed in the course of the opinion.
A further possibility is exemplified by Lind v. Eddy25 wherein a
minor owner was held liable under a statute making an automobile
owner liable for damages caused by the negligence of one using it
with his consent. Liability was based on the statute itself and did not
arise from the relation of principal and agent.
While Kentucky apparently has not had occasion to decide
whether or not a minor principal would be liable for the negligence
of an agent causing an automobile accident, some insight as to how
it would hold might be gained by a review of related Kentucky law.
Generally in Kentucky a contract executed by a minor is not
binding upon him, but is voidable at his option.26 Although this
would permit the court to say that an infant's appointment of an
agent is merely voidable and not void, the court has adopted the
opposite view.27 However, since most of the growth toward holding
the minor principal liable has been since Kentucky last ruled on the
point, such case authority should be given little weight. The Ken-
22107 N.J.L. 397, 153 Atl. 395 (1931).
23 Id. 153 AUl. 895, 396.
24285 Fed. 97 (8th Cir. 1923).
25232 Iowa 1328, 6 N.W. 2d 427 (1942); accord, Ridley v. Young, 64 Cal.
App. 2d 503, 149 P. 2d 76 (1944).
26 Wright v. Stanley Motor Co., 249 Ky. 20, 60 S.W. 2d 144 (1933).27 Semple v. Morrison, 23 Ky. (7 T.B. Mon.) 298 (1828); Pyle v. Cravens,
14 Ky. (4 Litt.) 17 (1823).
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tucky Court of Appeals might now be induced to follow the "vicar-
ious liability" approach described above in the second method.
Very close to the "primary negligence" approach described above
in the first method is Thixton v. Palmer.2 8 In holding a parent liable
under the "family purpose doctrine" the court said that negligence
of a friend whom the son had permitted to drive while he rode in
the back seat would be negligence of the son. The case supports the
proposition that the negligence of one driving a car under the con-
trol of a minor is the negligence of that minor, but it should be re-
membered that such finding did not make the minor liable for dam-
ages. It only permitted the court to hold the minor's parent liable
under the "family purpose doctrine." However, the case indicates
that the court might find the "primary liability" approach an easy
one to accept in holding the minor liable, since Kentucky follows
the general rule that a minor is liable for his own torts2 9
There is also the possibility in Kentucky that the question of age
of the minor principal will not be considered by the court unless
raised on behalf of the minor. Kentucky has said that for the defense
of infancy to be available, it must be pleaded.30
Conclusions
The purpose of permitting a minor to avoid a contract is to pro-
tect the minor, as justice would demand. When the results reached in
the contract situation are blindly applied to the tort situation in
which the minor is legally capable of acting but has another act
for him, an obvious injustice is committed. In the first situation we
are protecting the infant, while in the latter we would be shielding
him from responsibility which he would face had he acted rather
than his servant or agent.
It is submitted that the early courts misapplied the contractual
concept to the minor principal-agent field where a tort was involved
through an automobile accident. The growth in this area of the law
and the trend appear to be towards the imputation of negligence
to the minor principal.
The vicarious liability approach discussed above appears to be
the broadest of the methods used by the courts in their efforts to
find a rational basis on which to base the liability of the minor.
It would cover situations which would not come under the first
method unless the "alter ego" idea were stretched beyond reason.
28 210 Ky. 838, 276 S.W. 971 (1925). Cf. Annot., 44 A.L.R. 1382 (1926).
29 Stephens v. Stephens, 172 Ky. 780, 189 S.W. 1143 (1916) (Dictum).
OMullins v. Watkins, 146 Ky. 773, 143 S.W. 370 (1912). This case was
decided under a statute which was superseded by the Kentucky Rules of Civil
Procedure. Therefore, the value of the case today may be open to doubt.
[Vol. 47,
The second method also appears to be more logically reasoned in
that it is based upon sound agency principles, whereas the first
method is based upon fiction.
Wilbur D. Short
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-
KENTUCKY CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS AND PROPOSED
CHANGES IN THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
At the present time Kentucky, by statute, allows the use of the
information in circuit courts for the prosecution of certain misde-
meanors, and for all offenses within the jurisdiction of courts inferior
to the circuit court.1 The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the
extent to which the information may be used in Kentucky and to
examine its possible future uses.
Analysis of Constitution
The Kentucky Constitution § 12 provides:
No person, for an indictable offense, shall be proceeded against
criminally by information, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service, in time of war or
public danger, or by leave of court for oppression or misdemeanor
in office.
Since the exceptions within this section are extremely limited,
no particular importance is attached to them in the development of
this paper.
This provision, on its face, would appear to prohibit the use of
the information in all cases in which the indictment may be used,
and since the present use of the information2 overlaps the permitted
uses of the indictment, it would appear that the present use of the
information is partly unconstitutional. However, such a literal inter-
pretation has not been adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals.
The court has wisely limited the application of the constitutional
provision which otherwise would have tied the hands of a prosecut-
1 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 455.080 (1959) provides in part:
In circuit court, persons charged with misdemeanors for which the
highest penalty that may be imposed is a fine of one hundred dollars
and imprisonment for fifty days may be prosecuted . . .by information
filed by the Commonwealths attorney or county attorney in the cir-
cuit court. In courts inferior to circuit courts, any offense within thejurisdiction of the court may be prosecuted on [an] . ..information
filed before the judge or justice.
2Ky. Rev. Stat. § 455.080 (1959).
a3y Grim. Code § 9 (1959). The indictment or information may be used
in the circuit courts for offenses having punishments of not more than one hundred
dollars and imprisonment for fifty days.
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